rigors of strict scrutiny, the "political structure" cases surely do not require unencumbered political access to them. 6 In this Case Note, I accept for argument's sake CEE's interpretation of the Hunter doctrine. I argue that the court's use of strict scrutiny to do its heavy lifting involved significant slippage with regard to sex-based equal protection. Although CEE's holding applies to race-and sex-based programs, its analysis depends on factors unique to race-based strict scrutiny: the most restrictive means and purpose tests, 7 the underlying fact that courts persistently disfavor race-based preferences, and the rhetoric of colorblindness. None of these factors applies to current sex equality doctrine, however, rendering the application of CEE's final conclusions to sex-based preferences problematic.
I
The CEE court reached its conclusion by relying principally on the Supreme Court's race neutrality cases. Citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 8 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 9 Judge O'Scannlain explained that race-based preferences are "prohibit [ed] ... in all but the most compelling circumstances."' The court also cited United States v. Virginia (VM/)"-the first and last time a sex equality case was mentioned in the court's political structure analysis-for that case's strongest proposition: Sexbased classifications "demand an 'exceedingly persuasive justification."" ' Based on these precedents, the court explained that the Constitution "erects obstructions to preferential treatment by its own terms."' 3 Yet the profound difference in "terms" that current doctrine mandates for race, as distinct from sex, and the resulting difference in "obstructions" were never discussed.
Instead, the court's subsequent analysis conflated race and sex further. The court reasoned that states can enact (or not enact) all other constitutionally 6. See id. 7. Strict scrutiny employs the most rigid means and purpose tests by demanding that a classification be a "necessary" means for advancing a "compelling" state interest; intermediate scrutiny, which applied to gender classifications, requires only that a classification have a "substantial relationship" to an "important" state interest. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 219-20 (1995 II Under current law, the level of scrutiny given to sex classifications as compared to race classifications involves differences in both degree and kind. 2 Consequently, whenever CEE notes special rigors that attach to racebased preferences, the argument strays further from applicability to gender. [have] observed that the "government has the broad power to assure that physical differences between men and women are not translated into permanent handicaps, and that they do not serve as a subterfuge for those who would exclude women from participating fully in our economic system." Coral Constr Co., 941 F.2d at 932 (citation omitted). Notably, the structure of the argument Judge O'Scannlain adopted in Coral Construction is remarkably different from the analytic organization of CEE. The former opinion separately analyzed the discrete questions raised by strict and intermediate scrutiny, rather than virtually collapsing them under one framework as CEE does.
25. CEE, 110 F.3d at 1446.
remove barriers generated by past and persistent economic discrimination. 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis takes account of societal discrimination against women 2 7 and endorses preferences to equalize those conditions. 2 s As such, CEE's distinction between "political obstructions to equal treatment" and "political obstructions to preferential treatment" 29 is patently incoherent in the context of sex. CEE's use of colorblindness-to explain why minorities may seek only neutral interests in the political process-betrays a clear indication that the court's framework does not work for sex. Supreme Court doctrine has no colorblindness analogue for sex.
3 1 In fact, the long line of "similarly situated" sex equality cases (2d ed. 1988) (contrasting Justice Rehnquist's theory of race neutrality with his theory of difference for sex); see also United States v. Virginia (VMI). 116 S C1 2264. 2295-96 (1996) (Scalia. J . dissenting) (claiming that sounder arguments exist for lowenng sex equality review to rational basis than for elevating it to strict scrutiny); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U S 127, 154 (1994) (Rehnquist. C J. dissenting) (arguing that "sufficient differences between race and gender discnmination" mean that the Constitution's prohibition of race-based peremptory challenges should not extend to sex to sociological, 32 physiological, 33 or preexisting legal 34 conditions-an acknowledgment that is conceptually incongruent with the proposition that individuals of different races are, in general, similarly situated. 35 Also, in a "not similarly situated" case, the means and purpose tests may be suspended, 36 and the constitutional presumption may shift to favor the legislation. 37 In short, CEE's strong use of colorblindness to interpret the Hunter doctrine reveals the inappropriateness of applying its reasoning to sex.
III
The argument pursued here leads to several conclusions, a full elaboration of which is beyond the scope of this discussion. At a minimum, though, this Case Note exposes an error in CEE's reasoning, suggesting the need for review. The Ninth Circuit's confusion of sex-based equal protection and strict scrutiny-especially in a case justifying the permanent withdrawal of state preferences for women-runs afoul of doctrinal principles and precedent.
The Case Note's argument also puts into doubt the viability of the preference-focused framework itself. CEE recast the Hunter doctrine by shifting the focus of constitutional inquiry from the initiatives in question to the programs that the initiatives prohibit. Yet this framework-if faithfully executed-produces an anomalous result: broader legal protections for women than for racial minorities. Can the application of the Hunter doctrine-which has primarily focused on invalidating "[s]tate action [that] 'places special burdens on racial minorities in the political process'". 38 -yield broader political rights for a group that occupies a lower rung of the equal protection ladder? Perhaps to avoid this anomalous result, hombook law on the Hunter doctrine makes no distinction between "preferential treatment" and "equal treatment. 39 CEE's ability to avoid this same anomalous result, on the other hand, arguably depends on its misanalysis of sex equality doctrine.
-Ryan Goodman
